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Abstract: Drawing on Minsky’s theoretical framework, we critically assess the 
effectiveness of the currently implemented fiscal austerity measures in the Greek 
economy. We develop and apply two indexes that encapsulate the financial fragility in 
the public sector and the macroeconomy. The statistical evidence suggests that over 
the last 5-6 years prior to the onset of the crisis the public sector was situated in the 
ultra-ponzi area and the financial fragility of the Greek economy was steadily 
increasing, making the economy extremely vulnerable to potential shocks. We show 
that the fiscal austerity measures do not produce a substantial decline in the financial 
fragility of the public sector; they also set the stage for chronic financial instability in 
the economy. We call for a fundamental change in the policy mix currently 
implemented in the Greek economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On May 9 2010 the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the European Commission (EC) signed with the Greek government the 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP hereafter). The purpose of 
the MEFP was to provide financial support to the Greek government on the condition 
that certain fiscal austerity measures were to be implemented. One and a half year 
after the signing of the MEFP the financial situation in the public sector remains 
problematic and the debt of the general government turns out to be unsustainable. In 
addition the Greek economy is experiencing financial instability: the rise in the rate of 
non-performing loans is remarkable, the GDP has dropped like a rock, the 
unemployment rate is worsening and the confidence in the public has collapsed.  
 
The aim of this paper is to use as a basis a Minskyan framework of analysis to 
critically assess the effectiveness of the currently implemented policies in the Greek 
economy. In light of this objective, we initially develop two financial fragility 
indexes. The first pertains to the financial fragility of the government sector of a non-
sovereign country; the second captures the financial fragility of the whole 
macroeconomy. These indexes are applied to the Greek economy for the period prior 
to the onset of the crisis. The statistical evidence illuminates that the Greek economy 
was suffering from increasing financial fragility when the MEFP started to be 
implemented. We then proceed to assess the impact of the MEFP on: i) the financial 
fragility of the public and the banking sector; ii) the financial instability of the 
economy. We contend that the fiscal austerity measures do not set the stage for a 
substantial improvement in the financial status of the public sector; moreover, they 
amplify the debt-deflation process in the economy. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 uses as a basis Minsky’s framework to 
develop a financial fragility index for the government sector of a non-sovereign 
country. This index is applied to the Greek economy over the period 1988-2009. 
Section 3 puts forward a macroeconomic financial fragility index that pertains to both 
the private and the public sector of an economy. The index is estimated for the Greek 
economy over the period 2000-2009. In section 4 the impact of the currently 
implemented policies on the financial fragility of the government and the banking 
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sector along with the financial instability of the economy is put under detailed 
scrutiny. By way of conclusion, section 5 calls for a fundamental change in the policy 
mix currently implemented in the Greek economy. 
 
2. The financial fragility of the government sector 
 
In Minsky’s theoretical framework capitalism is conceptualized as an inherently 
unstable system whereby prolonged economic growth, euphoric expectations and 
institutional innovations can lead to increasing financial fragility, and eventually to 
financial instability. In Minsky’s framework the Big Government has a prominent role 
to play in narrowing down the financial fragility of the economy, as well as in 
preventing a debt-deflation process and a widespread economic downturn.
1
 Three are 
the main channels through which government can act as a stabilizer in the 
macroeconomy (see Minsky, 1986).
2
 First, when the economy experiences a 
downward spiral the rise in consumption and investment expenditures of the 
government can place a floor to the aggregate demand and the profits of firms. 
Second, given that government’s creditworthiness is beyond any doubt (Minsky, 
1995, p. 206), its bonds have the capacity to play the role of a risk-free asset, thus 
promoting the stability of the financial system and preventing a deterioration in the 
expectations of the public.
3
 Third, the government can function as an ‘employer of 
last resort’, providing work to those that cannot find one in the private sector, with 
substantial income and employment feedback effects (see Wray, 1998; Papadimitriou, 
2008; Argitis and Michopoulou, 2011). 
 
However, in a non-sovereign country, like Greece, these channels may not be 
operative. Greece and other eurozone countries do not have their own central bank 
and have relinquished their right for an autonomous fiscal policy.
4
 Wray (2003, p. 11) 
argues that non-sovereign government spending depends on the acceptance of 
government bonds in the financial markets, which in turn relies on the assessment of 
the credit risk. If this risk is conceived to be high, then the financing of government 
expenditures can be put under pressure.  
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Ferri and Minsky (1992) for the role of the government as a thwarting mechanism. 
2
 See also Arestis and De Antoni (2009) and Tymoigne (2010b). 
3
 See also Minsky and Adelman (1960). 
4
 See Sawyer (2001), Wray (2003), Sardoni and Wray (2006) and Kelton and Wray (2009). 
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Therefore, in such kind of countries the concept of financial fragility becomes crucial 
not only for the private but also for the public sector. The reason is twofold. First, the 
government sector can also be the root cause of financial instability. The higher is the 
financial fragility of the government sector the higher is the likelihood that a shock 
will create problems in the ability of government to finance its expenditures. Second, 
if the economy is brought to a recession due to the poor performance of the private 
sector, a highly financially fragile public sector may not be able to intervene to 
produce a rise in demand and employment.     
 
Minsky (1982, p. 33; 1992, p. 28) has pointed out that the financial fragility of the 
public sector can be categorized into hedge, speculative and ponzi according to its 
ability to repay its debt payment obligations.
5
 Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010) have recently 
applied the Minskyan taxonomy of finance in hedge, speculative and ponzi to the 
public sector of Brazil. They define the financial fragility index of the general 
government as the ratio of the primary surplus to the sum of interest and amortization. 
More precisely, their index is as follows: 
 
AmortInt
TeTr
FG


                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where Tr denotes the total government revenue, Te stands for the total primary 
government expenditure, Amort is the amortization of the government debt and Int 
denotes the interest payments. As FG becomes lower, the financial fragility of the 
government sector increases. If 1FG , the government sector is hedge: total revenue 
is larger than the sum of total primary expenditure, interest and amortization. If 
01  FG  the government sector is characterised as speculative: the primary budget 
surplus is unable to cover the sum of interest and amortization. Ponzi position 
corresponds to the case in which the public sector has a primary deficit ( 0FG ). 
                                                 
5
 Minsky (1986, p. 230) conceptualises financial fragility distinguishing among three types of financing 
positions. Hedge finance pertains to units whose expected cash inflows are more than sufficient to 
cover contractual commitments now and in the future. Speculative units have expected cash inflows 
that are unable to cover the cash payment commitments in the near term. These units fail to repay the 
amortization and need to turn to new finance in order to cover the financing gap. Ponzi units are similar 
to speculative ones. Their additional feature is that they cannot reimburse their interest obligations. 
Minsky (1986, p. 233) points out that the financial fragility of an economy is greater the greater the 
weight of speculative and ponzi units. 
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However, the above-mentioned index exhibits two shortcomings. First, if it is 
negative )( TeTr  , the financial fragility of the public sector turns out to increase as 
the sum of interest and amortization )( AmortInt   becomes smaller. This seems 
counterintuitive, as an increase in debt obligations of the government should decrease 
the index, portraying a rise in the financial fragility. Second, the implementation of 
Minsky’s categorization requires a distinction between the situation in which the 
government sector is capable of financing its interest without new finance and the 
situation in which this is not the case. This is not taken explicitly into account in the 
index of Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010). 
 
To deal with these two drawbacks, we put forward the following financial fragility 
index for the government sector of an economy: 
 
                          
Amort
IntTeTr 
,                   if 0 IntTeTr  
 
'FG                1
 AmortIntTe
Tr
,         if IntTeTr   and 0TeTr               (2) 
 
                          2
 AmortIntTe
Tr
,       if 0TeTr  
 
where 'FG  is our proposed financial fragility index for the government sector. The 
minimum value of the index is equal to -2. The financial fragility of the public sector 
increases as the index takes lower values. If the index takes values above 1 the public 
sector is characterized as hedge. This indicates that the primary surpluses cover the 
debt obligations. Speculative public sector pertains to the situation in which the 
primary surpluses are larger than the interest but less than the sum of interest and 
amortization. Then the index takes values between 0 and 1. Ponzi public sector cannot 
repay even the interest and must resolve to new finance. In this case the index takes 
values below 0 and above -1. Finally, the public sector is characterized as ultra ponzi 
when the primary balance is negative: the index lies between -2 and -1. The public 
 7 
sector must resort to new borrowing to finance both the debt obligations and the 
amount of total primary expenses that cannot be covered by total revenue. 
 
The proposed financial fragility index for the government sector resolves the two 
above-mentioned problems in the index of Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010). In particular, 
once the financial fragility index takes negative values, it becomes more negative as 
the debt obligations increase. Second, if the primary balance does not cover the sum 
of interest and amortization of the public sector, there is a distinction between a 
situation in which it can cover the interest (the index takes values between 0 and 1) 
and the situation in which this is not possible (the index takes values between -1 and 
0).
6
 
 
We proceed to estimate the proposed index for the government sector of Greece.
7
 
Figure 1 clearly shows that over the period 1988-2009 the financial fragility of the 
government sector in Greece was situated either in the ponzi or in the ultra ponzi area. 
Most of the years under examination the Greek public sector was financing its debt 
obligations entirely through external finance since the total revenue were failing to 
cover total primary expenditures. More precisely, over the 1988-1993 and 2003-2009 
time spans the public sector is characterized as ultra ponzi. Over the remaining years 
it is situated in the ponzi area since the government runs primary surpluses. 
 
It is important to note that the index starts increasing since 1993, which implies that 
the financial fragility gradually decreases in the period before Greece enters the 
eurozone. The financial fragility index of the government sector attains its maximum 
value at the year 1999, when Greece was assessed regarding its capacity to be a 
member of the eurozone. However, since 2000 the financial fragility of the 
government sector starts growing and 6 years before the onset of the sovereign debt 
crisis the public sector is situated again in the ultra ponzi area. Notice that the interest 
payments do not seem to have any impact on the increasing financial fragility after 
                                                 
6
 The proposed financial fragility index focuses on cash inflows and cash outflows from the operating 
activities of the public sector. This means that the index does not take directly into account the 
privatization receipts. However, the privatisation receipts have an indirect impact on our index. As they 
become larger, the sovereign debt declines (see e.g. European Commission 2011, p. 33). This brings 
down the interest and amortization for the subsequent years, thereby affecting indirectly the proposed 
index. 
7
 See the appendix for the description of the data sources. 
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2001. More specifically, we observe that the interest payments in percent (%) of GDP 
were becoming steadily lower since 2001 (see figure 2). With the interest rate on 
Greek government bonds decreasing, interest payments as a percent (%) of GDP 
remained approximately below 5% since 2003.  
 
Figure 1. Financial fragility index of the government sector, Greece, 1988–2009 
-1.60
-1.40
-1.20
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
Speculative
Ponzi
Hedge
Ultra ponzi
 
Source: Eurostat, Bank of Greece and Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance 
 
At this point we should draw attention to the following issue. The figures for the 
financial fragility index over the period 1988-2000 are not directly comparable with 
the figures for the index over the 2001-2009 time span. The reason is straightforward: 
before 2001 Greece was a sovereign country. This implies that being ultra-ponzi after 
2001 is a much more risky situation than being in this scheme in the years before the 
entrance to the eurozone. In a non-sovereign country a high level of financial fragility 
increases the likelihood that the country will not be capable at some point in time to 
have access to the bond market.      
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Figure 2. Interest and amortization in percent (%) of GDP, Greece, 1988-2009 
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Source: Eurostat, Bank of Greece and Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance 
 
Let us now briefly examine the underlying reasons that were conducive to the 
evolution of the financial fragility index of the government sector. Three are the main 
points. First, the amortization in percent (%) of GDP appears to correlate with the 
financial fragility index of the government. Figure 2 shows that the amortization was 
getting increasingly high since 2002 (with the exception of 2006) contributing to a 
large extent to the downward move of the index. Second, from Table 2 it turns out 
that total revenue in percent (%) of GDP in Greece was significantly lower than the 
average in the EU. In the period between 1995 and 2000 the total revenue gradually 
increased and got closer to the EU-15 magnitude. However, since the entrance to the 
eurozone there was a progressive slowdown of the total revenues. We get to the 
conclusion that the existence of low total revenues is potentially the main root cause 
of the rise in the financial fragility of the government sector.
8
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It is interesting to note that the main reason that total revenue of the Greek public sector was smaller 
in size than the average EU was due to tax evasion in Greece. 
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Table 1: Total government revenue, total government primary expenditure in percent (%) of GDP, 
Greece and EU-15, 1995-2009 
Greece EU-15 Greece EU-15
1995 36.7 45.2 34.5 47.2
1996 37.4 45.9 33.6 44.8
1997 39.0 45.9 35.6 43.7
1998 40.5 45.7 36.2 43.1
1999 41.3 46.1 37.0 43.1
2000 43.0 45.7 39.3 41.7
2001 40.9 45.1 38.8 42.8
2002 40.3 44.4 39.5 43.6
2003 39.0 44.4 39.8 44.4
2004 38.1 44.2 40.7 44.2
2005 38.6 44.7 39.3 44.3
2006 39.2 45.2 40.5 43.9
2007 40.0 45.2 41.9 43.2
2008 39.9 45.1 44.7 44.5
2009 37.3 44.5 47.6 48.6
Total government revenue 
(Tr )
Total government primary 
expenditure (Te )
 
Source: Eurostat, AMECO 
 
Third, the picture for the total primary expenditure as a percent (%) of GDP is 
different. Over the most of the period under consideration, the total primary 
expenditures as a percent (%) of GDP was in Greece significantly lower than that of 
the EU respective magnitude. We observe that only in 2008 Greece had higher 
primary expenditure relative to the average in the EU. However, it must be noted that 
the primary expenditures followed an upward trend over the period 2007-2009. This 
suggests that over the last 2 years prior to the debt sovereign crisis, the decline in the 
fragility index was matched by a rise in total primary expenditures. Despite this recent 
increase, it can be argued that the main culprit of the increase in the financial fragility 
of the government sector over the period 2001 to 2009 was the existence of low total 
government revenues and high amortization; the contribution of the size of primary 
expenditures and of the interest payments of the government seems to have been 
much lower. 
 
3. The financial fragility of the macroeconomy 
 
In a non-sovereign country, like Greece, the financial fragility of the government 
sector is of paramount importance. Nonetheless, it provides only a part of the whole 
picture. An overall assessment requires the evaluation of the financial fragility of both 
the private and the public sector.  
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Using as a basis the Minskyan framework, various researchers have attempted to 
measure the financial fragility in the private sector of modern capitalist economies. As 
far as the household sector is concerned, Pollin (1990), Brown (2007) and Tymoigne 
(2007, 2010a) have measured households’ financial fragility for the US economy, 
using the debt service ratio, which is equal to the ratio of households’ debt obligations 
to their disposable income.
9
 Financial fragility may arise as a result of the increase in 
interest payments, or in the shortage of income, or both. 
 
There have also been some attempts to measure the financial fragility of the non-
financial corporate sector. For example, Wolfson (1990, 1995) has argued that the 
financial fragility of the non-financial corporate sector can be portrayed by the ratio of 
net interest payments to gross capital income (before tax-profits plus depreciation plus 
net interest). The higher is this ratio the higher is the financial fragility of this sector. 
The fragility of the non-financial corporate sector can also be captured by applying 
the categorization of Minsky into hedge, speculative and ponzi units. Schroeder 
(2002, 2009) applies for the Thailand and the New Zealand economy Foley’s (2003) 
version of hedge, speculative and ponzi categorization. Firms are considered hedge 
when the rate of profit is larger than the rate of accumulation plus the rate of interest. 
When the rate of accumulation is greater than the profit rate, firms are classified as 
speculative. Ponzi finance corresponds to the situation in which the interest rate is 
higher than the profit rate. Arza and Espanol (2008) make use of another type of 
Minskyan taxonomy to measure the financial fragility in the Argentinean firms. 
Hedge finance exists when the cash flows (operating net earnings plus depreciation) 
of the firms can cover the short term liabilities and interest payments. Speculative 
finance is the occasion in which the firms cannot repay the short term liabilities but 
they can cover the interest payments out of the cash inflows. Ponzi units cannot 
reimburse the sum of interest payments and short term liabilities.  
 
As for the financial fragility of the banking sector, this has been estimated by Wolfson 
(1990, 1995) using the loan loss ratio (the ratio of net loan losses charge of less 
                                                 
9
 A similar index that captures financial fragility is the financial obligation ratio (see e.g. Cynamon and 
Fazzari, 2008). Compared to the debt obligation ratio, the financial obligation ratio also includes in the 
households’ obligations the automobile lease payments, the rental payments on tenant occupied 
property, the homeowners' insurance and the property tax payments. 
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recoveries to average loans outstanding) for the United States. An upward movement 
of the loan loss ratio is indicative of an increase in the financial fragility of the 
banking sector. Knutsen and Lie (2002) have also used the loan loss ratio to capture 
the financial fragility of the banks in Norway. 
 
Nonetheless, a limitation of the above-mentioned works is that they do not consider 
the financial fragility of the whole private sector. Thus, they can at best provide only a 
limited picture of private sector’s financial fragility. Minsky and Meyer (1972) have 
made a similar argument and have applied different indicators to measure the 
financial fragility of the private sector in the United States. Recently, Tymoigne 
(2011) has constructed financial fragility indexes for the whole private sector, namely 
households, non-financial corporate sector and financial business sector. The financial 
fragility is captured by both liquidity and solvency indexes. Tymoigne (2011) assesses 
the financial fragility index of each sector and includes, apart from the debt service 
ratio, the growth rate of outstanding total liabilities and net worth. As the growth rate 
of these variables increases, the index of each sector increases indicating accordingly 
the culminating financial fragility in the corresponding sector. 
 
Tymoigne (2011) estimated the constructed index for the US economy, i.e. for a 
sovereign country. In this paper we intend to construct an index for a non-sovereign 
country. Thus, our approach constitutes a synthesis of Tymoigne’s (2011) and Ferrari-
Filho et al. (2010) theoretical considerations. We build a macroeconomic financial 
index that exhibits the following two features. First, it is applied to both the public 
and the private sector in order to capture the financial fragility of the whole economy. 
Second, liquidity and solvency indicators are used in order to construct a financial 
fragility index of each sector.  
 
We first consider the liquidity index )( iL  for the three private sectors. This is the 
following: 
 
i
i
i
Yd
Int
L                                                                                                                        (3) 
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where FNFHi ,, ; the symbols H, NF and F correspond to household, non-
financial corporate and financial sector, respectively; iInt  denotes the interest income 
paid by sector i; Yd  is the gross disposable income before interest income paid for the 
household sector and the gross entrepreneurial income before interest income paid for 
the non-financial corporate and financial sector. The higher the value of the index, the 
larger the liquidity problems the corresponding sector is likely to face. 
 
In order to build the liquidity index of the government sector we use an alternative 
definition equal to one minus the ratio of total revenue to the sum of interest, 
amortization and total primary expenditures. In other words, the liquidity index of the 
public sector is expressed by the following formula: 
 
TeIntAmort
Tr
LG

1                                                                                             (4) 
 
where GL  is the liquidity index of the government sector. The index indicates that an 
increase in total government revenue or a decrease in amortization, interest payments 
or primary expenditure decrease, ceteris paribus, the liquidity problems of the 
government sector making it less vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
The solvency index is defined as the ratio of liabilities to assets under the condition 
that the assets are larger than the liabilities. If this condition does not hold, the 
solvency index is equal to one minus the ratio of assets to liabilities. In particular, the 
solvency index for both the private and the public sectors is calculated as follows: 
 
                  
i
i
As
Liab
,                        if ii LiabAs   
iS                                                                                                                               (5) 
                 
i
i
Liab
As
1 ,                    if ii AsLiab   
 
where GFNFHi ,,, ; the symbol G corresponds to the government sector, iS  is the 
solvency index of sector i, iAs  denotes the assets and iLiab  denotes the liabilities of 
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the i sector. This index expresses the insolvency risk in each sector. When there is a 
decrease in the possession of assets relative to liabilities, the solvency index increases, 
pinpointing the higher insolvency risk. 
 
Given the liquidity and solvency index, it is possible to determine the financial 
fragility index of each sector. The weight of each index in the financial fragility index 
is arbitrarily equal to 0.5. Accordingly, the financial fragility index of sector i is equal 
to: 
 
iii SLF 5.05.0                                                                                                           (6) 
 
where GFNFHi ,,, ; iF  is the financial fragility index of sector i. An increase in 
the liquidity index or in the solvency index of each sector will push upwards its 
financial fragility index. To put it differently, the higher is the value of the index the 
greater the financial fragility of the sector. Higher financial fragility increases the 
probability of occurrence financial instability. 
 
The macroeconomic financial fragility index )( EF  is defined as follows: 
 
GGFFNFNFHHE FwFwFwFwF                                                                           (7) 
 
The weight of each index ( iw ) is equal to the gross value added of each sector in 
percent of the total gross value added.
10
 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is useful to also define the relative contribution 
)( iC  of each sector’s financial fragility to the overall fragility. This is given by the 
following formula: 
 
E
ii
i
F
Fw
C                                                                                                                       (8) 
 
                                                 
10
 The gross value added of each sector is equal to the GDP of the economy minus taxes and plus 
subsidies on products. 
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When iC  increases, the contribution of the financial fragility of sector i to overall 
macroeconomic fragility becomes higher. This implies that there is a rise in the 
probability that an adverse shock in this sector will be the root cause of financial 
instability in the economy.  
 
We move on to present the above-mentioned indexes for the Greek economy over the 
period 2000-2009. The results are reported in Figure 3. The following points can be 
made. First, the financial fragility of the government sector was growing within the 
2000-2002 and 2007-2009 time spans. This is widely in line with the evolution of the 
index presented in section 2. The slight differences that can be observed within the 
2003-2006 time span stem from the fact that there was an improvement in the 
solvency index, due to the rise in the shares and other equities acquired by the 
government sector. These slight differences do not alter the main inferences of the 
analysis: i) the financial fragility of the Greek government sector was steadily rising 
over the post-EMU period; ii) the government sector was the most financially fragile 
sector of the economy. 
 
Second, there was a substantial deterioration in the financial fragility of households 
over the period 2000-2008. This mirrors the increase in both the solvency and 
liquidity indexes. The key driver of the rise in the financial fragility was the growing 
borrowing of households, which made higher their debt obligations and liabilities, 
relative to their disposable income and assets, respectively. In 2009 the financial 
fragility index dropped slightly as a result of the lower credit expansion due to the 
financial crisis. Although households’ financial fragility is the lowest compared to the 
other sectors of the economy, the fact that it was steadily increasing prior to the onset 
of the crisis has made the household sector vulnerable to potential shocks. It is also 
noteworthy that such a shock is likely to have substantial implications for the private 
consumption of the economy.     
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Figure 3. Financial fragility indexes: government, households, non-financial corporations, financial 
sector and the macroeconomy, Greece, 2000–2009 
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Source: Eurostat, Bank of Greece and Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance 
 
Third, the financial fragility of the financial sector was declining over the period 
2000-2004. This is basically associated with the improvement in the liquidity index as 
a result of the increasing profitability in this sector. After 2004 the index started 
shifting upwards: this was associated with the rise in the liabilities and the interest 
income paid by the financial sector. In 2008 the index decreased substantially, before 
increasing again in 2009. Fourth, there is no consistent pattern as far as the financial 
fragility of non-financial corporations is concerned. In general, the fragility of this 
sector did not change significantly over the period under consideration.  
 
Fifth, the financial fragility of the macroeconomy was steadily increasing. The most 
important rise took place over the period 2004-2009: the index reached from nearly 
0.29 in 2004 to more than 0.36 in 2009. This rise stemmed basically from the 
deterioration in the financial status of the government and households. In 2009 the 
financial fragility of the economy was at its peak. Therefore, the sovereign debt crisis 
that erupted in 2009 found the Greek economy in a highly financially fragile situation.  
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At this point it is useful to also have a look at the relative contribution of each sector 
to the overall financial fragility. As we have already elaborated, the financial fragility 
of each sector may affect the macroeconomic index differently. From Table 2 two 
main points can be inferred. First, the non-financial corporations had the most 
significant contribution to the determination of the overall financial fragility. The sum 
of the contributions of the non-financial corporate sector and the household sector lies 
between 0.77 and 0.81. On the other hand, the financial sector contributed at least to 
the determination of the macroeconomic fragility. However, the latter should be 
interpreted with caution: the value added of the financial sector is a priori small. 
Thus, a different way of constructing weights would potentially portray a higher 
contribution of the financial sector to overall fragility.   
 
Table 2: Contribution of each sector to the macroeconomic financial fragility index, Greece, 2000–
2009 
Non-financial 
corporations
General 
government
Financial 
corporations
Households
2000 0.57 0.25 0.08 0.10
2001 0.56 0.26 0.06 0.12
2002 0.51 0.29 0.05 0.15
2003 0.52 0.27 0.04 0.17
2004 0.50 0.27 0.05 0.18
2005 0.51 0.25 0.05 0.19
2006 0.50 0.24 0.05 0.21
2007 0.48 0.23 0.07 0.22
2008 0.41 0.25 0.06 0.28
2009 0.39 0.29 0.06 0.26  
Source: Eurostat, Bank of Greece and Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance 
 
Second, we can observe that over the period 2000-2009 the contribution of the non-
financial corporations was steadily decreasing; on the other hand, the contribution of 
the household sector to financial fragility was growing. Thus, the household sector 
became more important in the determination of the macroeconomic fragility. The 
contribution of the other two sectors remained almost unchanged.  
 
To sum up, the above statistical evidence highlights that the growing financial 
fragility in the Greek economy over the last 5 years was mainly linked with the 
increasing fragility of households and the government. The financial fragility of the 
financial sector was also substantial, even though our index suggests that it did not 
contribute significantly to the rise in the overall financial fragility.     
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4. Fiscal austerity measures in the Greek economy: Are they effective? 
 
In the spring of 2010 the government sector could not keep up financing its budget 
deficit through the sovereign bond markets, due to the excessive rise in the interest 
rate of the government bonds. On May 9 2010 the IMF, the ECB and the EC signed 
with the Greek government the MEFP. The purpose of MEFP was to provide financial 
support to the Greek government, on the condition that certain fiscal austerity 
measures were to be implemented.
11
 The IMF and the European Commission were 
agreed to be responsible for observing the execution of the budgetary performance 
criteria
12
, the structural fiscal reforms and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
 
The fiscal measures included in the MEFP can be divided into two sides: the tax 
revenue side and the primary government expenditure side. At the tax revenue strand 
the measures targeted to increase the value added tax (VAT) rates in order to reduce 
the budget deficit by 1.2 billion euros. At the primary government expenditure side 
the main aim was to reduce the budget deficit by 4.5 billion euros via i) the decrease 
in public consumption and investment expenditures and ii) the decline in the wages of 
the public sector employees and in the pensions. It is important to point out that not 
all measures were identified in the initial agreement. A significant proportion of these 
measures were agreed to be identified in 2011.  
 
In June 2011 the Greek government designed and voted in the Greek parliament the 
Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS hereafter).
13
 Table 3 reports these measures and 
their quantitative effect on the budget deficit. The measures focus on the extra cut of 
wages in the public sector employees, the decline in primary expenditures (state 
operations expenditure, state transfers to local governments, extra-budgetary funds 
expense, social benefits, defense expenditure, healthcare and pharmaceutical 
expenditure) and the increase in taxes via a further rise in VAT. The distinguishing 
feature of the MTFS is the privatization program, the aim of which is to decrease the 
public debt by 50 billion euros over the period 2011-2015.  
                                                 
11
 The MEFP was established under the law No. 3845/2010. 
12
 The quantitative performance criteria are in terms of a ceiling of state budgetary primary spending, 
on overall stock of central government debt, on new central government guarantees and on non-
accumulation of external debt payments arrears by the general government. 
13
 The MTFS passed into law on July 1 2011. 
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Table 3: Privatization receipts and measures’ effect on the budget deficit under the Medium Term 
Fiscal Strategy (MTFS), in million euros, Greece, 2011-2015 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Privatization receipts 3,000 7,500 11,000 13,500 15,000
Total measures 6,115 7,566 4,374 4,932 3,964
Wage bill 770 600 448 306 71
Operational expenses 190 92 161 323 370
Extra-budgetary funds 540 150 200 200 150
State-owned enterprises 414 329 297 274
Defense expenditure 133 133 134
Health care and pharmaceutical spending 310 697 349 303 463
Social benefits 1,188 1,230 1,025 1,010 700
Investment spending 950 350 350 350 350
Other expenditure 150 355 345 350 305
Tax compliance 878 975 1,147
Tax policy 2,017 3,678 156 685  
Source: IMF (2011), European Commission (2011) 
 
Table 4 shows the evolution of the main fiscal variables over the period 2011-2015, if 
all the aforementioned measures are to be implemented. At a first sight, the aim of 
MTFS is to eradicate the primary deficit and transform it into a primary surplus of 
1.5% of GDP in 2012. The MTFS’s target of decreasing deficit will be successful if 
the revenue remains at an almost constant level and primary expenditure gradually 
decreases. The MFTS’ target is to increase the taxes on income and property and to 
cut wages in the public sector. According to the IMF’s projections, the gross debt in 
percent (%) of GDP will keep rising till 2012 and will start to slow down since 2013. 
 
Table 4: General government forecast under the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS), in percent (%) 
of GDP, Greece, 2011-2015 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
General government balance -7,6 -6,5 -4,8 -2,6 -1,5
General government primary balance -0,8 1,5 3,6 6,4 7,7
Total revenues 40,9 42,2 41,9 42,0 41,6
Taxes on income and property 7,4 7,9 7,9 8,2 8,4
Primary expenditure 41,7 40,8 38,3 35,6 33,9
Wages of the public sector 11,0 10,3 9,2 8,4 8,1
Interest 6,8 8,0 8,4 9,0 9,2
Gross debt 166,0 172,0 170,0 160,0 146,0  
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
The key issue is to what extent the above-mentioned measures are capable of 
decreasing the financial fragility of the public sector and bringing the recession to the 
end. Figure 4 plots the financial fragility index for the Greek government over the 
period 1988-2015. The public sector became in 2010 less financial fragile in 
 20 
comparison to 2009. This picture of a decreasing financial fragility of the government 
is consistent with the implemented initial fiscal austerity measures of MEFP that 
brought down the total primary expenditure and increased the total revenue of the 
government. Nevertheless, the public sector remained in the ultra ponzi area along 
with increased debt obligations. 
 
The data for the 2011-2015 time span rely on the forecasts of the IMF (2011). Given 
the hypothesis of a primary surplus in 2012 the public sector is expected to turn from 
the ultra-ponzi to the ponzi scheme.
14
 However, three points are in order. First, 
despite this anticipated jump into the ponzi area no significant improvement is 
expected to occur after 2012. The underlying reason is that the interest and 
amortization amounts will remain extremely high over this period, preventing the 
index to move further upwards, despite the hypothesized continuous decline in the 
primary deficit.  
 
Figure 4. Financial fragility index of the government sector, Greece, 1988–2015 
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Source: Eurostat, Bank of Greece, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance and IMF (2011) 
 
                                                 
14
 Interestingly, the privatization flows are not enough for the public sector in order to jump into the 
speculative area. 
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Second, the macroeconomic scenario that is behind the IMF projections is extremely 
optimistic. Table 5 shows the hypotheses regarding the evolution of the GDP 
components over the period under consideration. We can observe that the key driver 
behind the rise in the GDP after 2012 is the private and external sectors. The formula 
is that the exports, private consumption and the private gross fixed capital formation 
will increase significantly and will contribute to the rise in the GDP. However, it is 
questionable whether Greece will reach a positive real growth rate of output given 
that the investor sentiment has collapsed. It is not by accident that this scenario has 
already overturned: the most recent estimates suggest that the GDP growth rate will 
be -2.5% in 2012 (see Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
 
Table 5: Real GDP and components of nominal GDP under the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS), 
in percentage (%) change, Greece, 2010-2015 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP -4,5 -3,9 0,6 2,1 2,3 2,7
Nominal private consumption -4,6 -4,9 -1,2 1,1 1,2 1,4
Nominal public consumption -8,3 -8,4 -5,0 -1,0 -0,3 0,3
Nominal gross fixed capital formation -16,5 -8,8 -1,5 2,7 4,0 5,0
Change in stocks (contribuiton) 1,6 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Nominal exports of goods and services 3,8 6,4 6,7 6,5 6,6 6,8
Nominal imports of goods and services -4,8 -4,2 -3,3 1,9 2,8 3,2  
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
Our third point rests on figure 5 which provides a more detailed consideration of the 
liquidity status of the public sector, showing the financing needs and the financing 
sources of the public sector over the period 2011-2015. On the left column of the 
figure there are the financing needs of the government sector due to interest payments, 
amortization, primary deficit (whenever it exists) and other amounts (bank assistance 
and stock-flow adjustments). On the right column the financing sources of the 
government sector are depicted: primary surplus (whenever it exists), official 
financing via the MEFP, privatization receipts and a remaining amount that is to be 
covered by a combination of voluntary private sector rollover, new funding from euro 
area member states and the assumed access to the bond market. Figure 5 clearly 
shows that despite the creation of budget primary surpluses, these amounts cannot 
cover more than 28 percent of the interest and amortization payments. This data 
allows us to argue that, even if the macroeconomic scenario turns out to be true, the 
improvement in the financial status of the public sector will not be substantial. 
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Figure 5. Financing needs and sources of the public sector, in billion euro, Greece, 2011-2015 
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Source: IMF (2011) 
* Other amounts include bank assistance and stock-flow adjustments. 
** Amount to be covered consists of voluntary private sector rollover, new funding from euro area 
member states and market access of the public sector. 
 
We move on to consider the impact of the crisis and fiscal austerity measures on the 
financial fragility of the banking sector and the instability in the economy. Our 
analysis relies on table 5, which depicts the real GDP and its nominal components for 
the period 2010-2015, and on table 6 that presents some indicators for the banking 
sector over the period 2006-2015.  
 
The financial fragility of the banking sector can be proxied by two ratios: i) the loans 
to deposits ratio
15
 and ii) the ECB liquidity support to liabilities ratio. As these ratios 
become higher the financial fragility of the banking sector arguably increases. From 
table 6 we can see that in 2009 the loans to deposits ratio started going upwards. This 
increase is the outcome of lower deposits in the Greek banking sector, which in turn 
emanates from the decline in macroeconomic activity (which decreases the 
households’ wealth) and the deterioration in expectations of households and firms. 
The banking sector has used as a substitute the liquidity of the ECB: the ratio of ECB 
                                                 
15
 See Forman et al. (1984) for a theoretical proposition and Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) for an 
application in the Southeast Asian countries. 
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liquidity support to liabilities starts increasing in 2009. It is also noteworthy that the 
deposits relative to liabilities continue to decline in 2010 and 2011. Overall, the rise in 
uncertainty and the economic contraction have amplified the financial fragility in the 
banking sector.  
 
Table 6. Banking sector indicators, 2006-2015 
Loans to 
deposits
ECB liquidity 
support to 
liabilities
Capital and 
reserves to 
liabilities
Deposits to 
liabilities
Rate of non 
performing 
loans*
2006 1.08 0.02 0.08 0.66 5.40
2007 1.07 0.02 0.07 0.64 4.50
2008 1.07 0.09 0.06 0.60 5.00
2009 1.11 0.10 0.08 0.57 7.70
2010 1.28 0.19 0.09 0.54 10.40
2011 1.41 0.22 0.10 0.51 11.50
2012 1.36 0.18 0.11 0.54
2013 1.31 0.15 0.11 0.57
2014 1.27 0.11 0.12 0.59
2015 1.22 0.09 0.12 0.62  
Source: IMF (2011) 
*The rate of non performing loans for 2011 is for Q1. 
 
The IMF projections suggest that the fragility of the banking sector will be driven 
down in the period 2012-2015. This relies on the assumption that the deposits in the 
banking sector will increase and the ECB liquidity support will become smaller. 
However, given the increasing uncertainty in the Greek economy and the lower 
income of households (due to wage decreases and tax increases) it remains 
particularly questionable whether banks’ deposits will increase to bring down their 
financial fragility. 
 
The next issue is the impact of the implemented measures on the overall 
macroeconomic performance.
16
 In section 3 we pointed out that before the onset of 
the crisis the Greek economy was experiencing growing financial fragility. Following 
Minsky, we can argue that the implementation of fiscal austerity measures in an 
economy which is financially fragile and has already entered in a deep recession is 
expected to have devastating effects on the overall macroeconomic performance. This 
is particularly clear if someone looks at the GDP growth in years 2010 and 2011. 
There is a substantial drop in the GDP, which stems from the brisk decline in the 
public consumption and investment expenditures. Simultaneously, the private 
                                                 
16
 See also Papadimitriou et al. (2010). 
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expenditures do not seem to fill the gap in aggregate demand that has been created by 
the decrease in public expenditures. 
 
This decline in the GDP has negative feedback effects on the financial instability of 
the economy. Table 6 shows the noteworthy rise in the rate of non-performing loans, 
which has risen from 7.70% in 2009 to 11.50% in 2011. Overall, the decrease in the 
wages of the public sector employees and in social benefits along with the increase in 
taxes lead to a shrinkage in income of household and a decline in their ability to meet 
payment commitments. These conditions put the grounds of an amplifying debt-
deflation process. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, a Minskyan framework of analysis was used to assess the fiscal austerity 
measures in the Greek economy. Applying financial fragility indexes for the public 
sector and the macroeconomy we pinpointed the growing financial fragility in the 
Greek economy over the last 5-6 years prior to the onset of the crisis. We then used 
statistical evidence that relies on IMF’s projections to evaluate the impact of the 
austerity measures on the financial fragility of the government and banking sectors, as 
well as on the financial instability of the economy. Our analysis casts considerable 
doubt on the effectiveness of the programme agreed by the IMF-ECB-EC and the 
Greek government. One and a half year after the implementation of fiscal austerity 
measures the Greek economy remains mired in a depression, without any prospect for 
a substantial improvement in the financial fragility of the government sector.  
 
Our analysis calls for a fundamental change in the policy mix currently implemented 
in the Greek economy. Since the austerity measures amplify the financial instability in 
the economy, the pressure for adopting such kind of measures should be relieved. The 
target of decreasing the high budget deficit should be set on a medium-term basis 
rather than on a short-term one, paying particular attention to the decrease in tax 
evasion. The latter was shown to be the root cause of the rise in the financial fragility 
of the government sector in the period prior to the onset of the crisis. Furthermore, the 
emphasis should be placed on measures and policies that enhance economic growth 
and employment both in the short- and the medium-term.  
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Appendix: Description of data sources 
Definition Period Database
Total government revenue (Tr ) 1988-2010 Eurostat
Total government primary expenditure (Te ) Eurostat
Interest payments of the government sector (Int ) Eurostat
Amortization of central government and social security 
funds (Amort )
General Directorate of the treasury and the budget public debt 
directorate, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance and Bulletin of 
conjectural indicators, Bank of Greece
Interest income paid of the i  private sector (Int i ) 2000-2009 Eurostat
Income before interest payments of the i  private sector (Yd i ) Eurostat
Assets of the i  sector (As i ) Eurostat
Liabilities of the i  sector (Liab i ) Eurostat
Gross value added (wi) Eurostat
Total government revenue (Tr ) 2011-2015 IMF (2011)
Total government primary expenditure (Te ) IMF (2011)
Interest payments of the government sector (Int ) IMF (2011)
Amortization of central government and social security 
funds (Amort ) IMF (2011)
Loans IMF (2011)
Deposits IMF (2011)
ECB liquidity support IMF (2011)  
 
 
